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The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched as a leitmotif of China’s economic diplo-
macy in 2013 after Xi Jinping assumed power. Inevitably, China’s behaviors in international 
oil and gas cooperation have been influenced by the BRI in terms of policy purpose, coopera-
tion model, business organization, and even energy security strategy. Under the BRI, China’s 
originally primary purpose of natural resource access in oil and gas cooperation has shifted 
to a business-based strategy. Meanwhile, China has constructed oil and gas pipelines as com-
mon interest-based interconnections of infrastructures, instead of getting involved in geopo-
litical games. In the process, China and large national companies play as partners and coor-
dinators more often even as their traditional roles are operators and majority shareholders. 
Coupled with the transition of purpose, the cooperation model also changes to an industrial 
chain-based model. China’s overseas oil and gas cooperation transitioned from an “upstream-
downstream integration” model to a “module plug-in” model, which flexibly includes natural 
resources, trade, transportation, refining and engineering services to prompt the “going-out” 
of China’s technology, equipment, and industrial capacity. In the organization of international 
oil and gas cooperation, coordination among the majors of Chinese national oil companies, 
and between national oil companies and other actors has become independent. The Yamal 
project provides an empirical case that displays China’s transition in international oil and gas 
cooperation under the BRI in this article.
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Introduction
Several factors have contributed to the People’s Republic of China’s soaring demand 
for energy in past decades, such as economic growth, a higher living standard, and the 
country’s integration into the global economic system. However, the domestic production 
of energy is far lower than what China needs, especially in oil and gas. In recent years un-
der Xi Jinping, China’s environmental policy has also challenged the use of coal that still 
accounts for the greatest proportion (about 60 %) of Chinese primary energy consump-
tion; the environment policy of cutting coal consumption has additionally produced a 
request for a greater degree of security for the oil and gas supply. After 1993, when China 
became a net importer of crude oil, Chinese national oil companies (CNOCs) launched 
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their overseas campaigns to seek international cooperation on oil and gas, becoming the 
earliest Chinese commercial entities to engage in the international business arena.
By 2013, the year President Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 
CNOCs have completed their 20-year “going-out” strategy. In the process, CNOCs accu-
mulated substantial experience and skills in the international oil and gas arena, particu-
larly concerning energy resource investment, exploration and development, engineering 
service, construction, and equipment; moreover, they formed their own international co-
operation models, such as the “upstream-downstream integration” (UDI) and “oil-backed 
loans plus infrastructure”. At the same time, CNOCs in global competition also acknowl-
edged major drawbacks in their business operation, such as their feeble technical com-
petitiveness against international oil companies and financial losses owing both to failed 
projects and asset mismanagement. The genesis of the BRI ensures that China’s overseas 
oil and gas cooperation must inevitably merge with the mega geo-economic strategy dur-
ing of Xi’s presidency. Nevertheless, international oil and gas cooperation and CNOCs’ 
overseas operations are influenced both politically and economically by the BRI. The 
shaping effect of the BRI upon China’s international oil and gas cooperation is the topic 
of this article. After first introducing the foundation of international oil and gas coopera-
tion before the BRI, it then analyzes the fundamental principle in international economic 
cooperation of the BRI. Next, the article will detail and examine how these principles are 
applied to the oil and gas business, followed by a case study of the role played by China and 
CNOCs’ in the Yamal Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Consortium (hitherto Yamal project), 
as empirical evidence. Finally, the shaping effect of the BRI upon China’s international oil 
and gas cooperation will be discussed.
The foundation of international oil and gas cooperation in the BRI
Xi Jinping introduced the concept of the BRI in 2013 in Kazakhstan and Indonesia. 
The BRI includes two major branches. The first is the Economic Belt of the Silk Road that 
connects China with Russia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The second is 
the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road that traverses Southeast Asia and links China to the 
Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean. It is easy to notice that the two eco-
nomic corridors cover the most important energy producers and energy transportation 
routes worldwide.
In the framework of the BRI, energy is a priority issue in China’s development and 
state security strategies. According to Xi Jinping, and energy supply security should be 
built on both domestic production, in addition to international cooperation [1]. However, 
the fact is, in past 25 years, China has been increasingly dependent on external energy 
supply. At the end of the second decade of 21st  century, more than 70 % of the crude oil 
and 45 % of the natural gas China consumes come from overseas. Such a high external en-
ergy dependency is always evaluated as a potential risk to national economic development 
and social stability. By far, several key suppliers of oil and gas, including Russia, Central 
Asia, and the Middle East, are in the key regions of BRI planning. Kazakhstan, where 
Xi Jinping announced the BRI to the world, was one of China’s earliest energy partners. 
Therefore, energy cooperation is relevant for the BRI.
The foundation of energy cooperation in BRI is the rich energy resource in BRI 
regions. The crude oil reserves in BRI countries reach 13.15  billion tons, accounting 
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for 55 % of the global share; the natural gas reserves reach 142 trillion cubic meters, ac-
counting for 76 % of the global share [2]. The oil and gas industries also play a key role 
in the energy resource countries in BRI regions. As China is one of the largest and most 
crucial energy markets worldwide with a great potential for increased energy demand, 
the reciprocal relation in energy cooperation between China and the BRI regions should 
be solid.
Before the BRI, CNOCs and a number of Chinese private energy companies engaged 
in cooperation within the BRI regions. For example, China National Petroleum Corpora-
tion (CNPC), perhaps the bellwether of the CNOCs, was engaged in more than 50 pro-
jects in Russia, Central Asia, Middle East, and Southeast Asia in 2014 and realizing an an-
nual equity output equal to 50 million tons of crude oil [3, p. 29]. Sinopec Group has more 
than 20 projects in BRI regions with combined equity output of 25 million tons [4, p. 31]. 
The smaller China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) also had eight projects in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Due to the effort of both the Chinese companies and 
their cooperation partners, there were until 2014 several mega energy infrastructures con-
necting China and neighboring countries in operation, notably the China-Central Asia 
Natural Gas Pipeline, the China-Kazakhstan Oil Pipeline, the China-Russia Oil Pipeline, 
and the China-Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipeline, among others, forming the annual import 
capacity of 35 million tons of crude oil and 67 billion cubic meters of natural gas. Such 
international oil and gas cooperation initiatives largely improved China’s energy supply, 
boosted the political trust between China and its partners, and critically laid down a solid 
foundation for the BRI for further development in other social, economic and develop-
mental aspects.
The principles of BRI to international economic cooperation
One of the most important characteristics of the BRI is its emphasis upon “connectiv-
ity” in international economic cooperation. In the speech in Astana, Xi highlighted five 
key fields for connectivity within the BRI framework, including policy, transportation, 
trade, finance, and people-to-people communication [5]. The traditional implication of 
“connectivity” always refers to one instrumental policy for one specific purpose, such as 
building an oil pipeline to access oil resources. However, under the BRI framework, the 
multi-level and multi-themes “connectivity” become the strategic purpose, rather than 
simple instruments, to some degree. Xi publicly said that “China should not be the solo 
actor in the BRI… and what China wants is not its own backyard but a public garden” [6]. 
In comparison, as a systematic strategy, BRI upholds the idea that different economic 
factors should serve and support each other in the multi-themes connectivity. Finally, 
the BRI is also placed with the purpose of platform for economic globalization and com-
mon prosperity. This is done with an eye on contributing to the grand concept of building 
“Community of Shared Future for Mankind” [7].
Another, perhaps unintentional, consequence of the BRI’s emphasis upon “connec-
tivity” is that China has begun to pay more attention to economic cooperation with its 
neighboring countries. Physical connectivity and economic policy coordination is easier 
to build between neighboring countries. Regarding the energy issue, cooperation with 
countries sharing a border with China can escape the potential risks from long distant 
transportation and transit counties. Such countries naturally have a higher degree of en-
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ergy security implications for China, especially compared with countries in Africa and 
Latin America countries [8].
Another important principle of the BRI is the decisive role of the market mecha-
nism in international economic cooperation. The State Council’s National Development 
of Reform Commission (NDRC), the highest economic planning organ of China, issued a 
guideline that the BRI “will abide by market rules and international norms, give play to the 
decisive role of the market in resource allocation and the primary role of enterprises, and 
let the governments perform their due functions” [9]. China, in the process of publicizing 
the BRI to external world, attempted to select careful wording that would avoid creating 
the impression by other countries that the BRI was a geopolitically driven project or inter-
national development assistance at China’s economic expense. 
The transition of China’s international oil 
and gas cooperation under the BRI
Because of the guidelines stipulated by the BRI, CNOCs and perhaps the whole 
Chinese oil industry have to adapt to the new political climate. Compared with the past 
20 years “going-out”, the major transition is reflected in four dimensions: the purpose, the 
cooperation model, the business organization, and, finally, the energy security strategy.
The changing purpose in international oil and gas cooperation
The natural resource was the core purpose in China’s international oil and gas coop-
eration. The fundamental principle of China’s participation in international oil and gas 
cooperation was declared as “two markets, two kinds of resources”. This referred to do-
mestic and international markets of crude oil and natural gas; the internal logic of this 
principle was to use international resources to cover the domestic gap between produc-
tion and consumption. Guided by this principle over the past 20 years, CNOCs strove to 
be the “operator” in international oil and gas cooperation. In the process, CNOCs could 
easily access to the upstream resources in other countries. Meanwhile, employing flexible 
models such as “Upstream-Downstream-Integration (UDI)” [10] and “Oil-backed Loans 
Plus Infrastructure” [11], CNOCs can generate the energy production capacity in a short 
timeframe in tough conditions overseas and transport oil and gas produced overseas to 
international and Chinese markets, with relatively low cost. Such cooperation effectively 
reduces the geopolitical risks for China, through several key oil and gas import channels.
Under natural resource-centered approaches, China has successfully maintained up-
stream cooperation in several countries since the 1990s, especially in countries such as 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in Central Asia; in Sudan, Chad, Niger, and Angola in 
Africa; and Iraq in Middle East. With the development of these kinds of cooperation, 
several key oil and gas import channels connecting China with Russia, Central Asia, and 
Myanmar were completed, as introduced above, in addition to the oil and gas imported 
from China’s eastern costal region. These endeavors effectively guaranteed the oil and gas 
supply security for China.
However, with the development of international and domestic oil and gas markets, 
the old resource-centered strategies have consistently been challenged by various factors. 
Initially, due to increasing investment volume and operation difficulty, CNOCs are not 
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easy to control any single project or to serve as operator of a project. Meanwhile, with the 
experience of the international oil and gas arena and the energy resources controlled, the 
coordination capacity of CNOCs has been substantially enhanced. Under these condi-
tions, CNOCs are more able and willing to operate transportation of crude oil and gas on a 
global scale, but not to ship all overseas productions back to China. With this background, 
in responses to the BRI, China’s purpose of international oil and gas is also changed.
Initially, CNOCs do not regard being “operator” or being the biggest shareholder as 
the primary demand in international oil and gas cooperation. In turn, CNOCs are in-
clined to cooperate with other international/national oil companies to diversify invest-
ments and mitigate risks. Typical cases include the Kashagan project in Kazakhstan and 
the Yamal project in Russia’s Arctic region. In the transition, the prioritized target incre-
mentally changed from to access to energy resources to the economic benefit and the 
networks with international partners.
Meanwhile, in addition to the purpose to natural resource, the construction of oil 
and gas pipelines no longer shoulder the responsibility to transport oil and gas to China 
alone; rather, this would be accomplished via an economic network to realize regional 
connectivity and prosperity. For example, the first line of the China-Central Asia Natu-
ral Gas Pipeline (Line-A) was completed in 2009, with a focus on transportation of gas 
in Central Asia to China. With the development of the infrastructure, the third pipeline 
(Line-C) and the Beineu-Bozoy-Shymkent Pipeline were completed in 2015, also trans-
ported natural gas to the Southern part of Kazakhstan, making local use of natural gas 
possible. Based on the Line-C and the Beineu-Bozoy-Shymkent Pipeline, Kazakhstan is 
constructing the Salyarka Pipeline to supply natural gas to the capital city Nur-Sultan. The 
proposed Line-D will even further connect two Central Asian countries with no rich oil 
and gas resources, namely Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, to the China-Central Asia Natural 
Gas Pipeline. This move cannot be explained by traditional pipeline construction logic for 
China. Rather, this move is motivated by the BRI principle of serving the broader region 
rather than China alone.
Industrial chain-based cooperation
One of the most critical guidelines of the BRI is the international cooperation on 
production capacity [12]. The construction and engineering services in the oil industries 
in BRI regions could reach to US$ 200  billion and 50  billion, respectively [13]. When 
CNOCs no longer regard access to energy resources as the ultimate target, the industrial 
based cooperation becomes a new focus. This has accelerated under the BRI.
A very successful approach by CNOCs in international oil and gas cooperation is the 
so-called UDI model. Under the UDI model, CNOCs simultaneously operate upstream 
exploration and development and provide services in drilling, oilfield construction, de-
sign, and construction of pipelines, refineries, and equipment. The UDI model effectively 
coordinates the different industrial sectors in oil industry, reducing the cost and time, 
increasing the profitability of CNOCs’ international cooperation. In past decade, this UDI 
model even constructs the oil industry in some start-up resource countries that did not 
have oil industry and import crude oil, showing both economic and political benefits [14].
The UDI model also faces increasing difficulties in recent years, with the expansion 
of UDI model. Initially, CNOCs compete for internal interests within UDI projects; such 
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competition exists among actors of different parts in the same industrial chain over a 
single project or among actors of the same business in different projects. In this scenario, 
the advantages of UDI model must be compromised. Meanwhile, with the development 
of oil and gas cooperation, the demand of engineering and construction know-hows are 
increasingly specialized. CNOCs are incapable of handling the whole industrial chain 
in highly various UDI projects, especially in some super-size UDI projects or high-tech 
driven UDI projects. Therefore, there is an urgent need for cooperation among different 
specialized companies in resource, technology, equipment, construction, and business to 
revise the current UDI model. Therefore, under the BRI, China’s UDI model is quick-
ly shifting to one of industrial chain-based cooperation. The emphasis upon industrial 
chain-based cooperation is no longer to take external natural resources into China but to 
export China’s capacities in technology, equipment, and construction out to international 
cooperation partners.
The CNPC’s role in Yamal exemplifies the industrial chain-based cooperation. CNPC 
only holds a 20 % share in the project; also the original proposed market of Yamal pro-
ject was Europe. CNPC can control neither the decision-making nor natural resource 
throughout the project. However, CNPC, as chief coordinator on the Chinese side, active-
ly introduces Chinese companies in engineering, construction, equipment, ship-building 
and financial service into the Yamal project. In the process, at least 45 Chinese companies 
provide more than 100 types of products or services to the Yamal project, promoting the 
international presence and technological development of Chinese companies [15].
The transformation of business organization
In this article, business organization refers to the relations among different Chinese 
actors in the international oil and gas cooperation. On the Chinese side, Chinese cen-
tral government and CNOCs are the most direct and dominant actors; moreover, their 
behaviors are intimately connected with China’s energy security and economic interests. 
Beside CNOCs, various government organs, think-tanks, financial institutions and other 
supporting units in China’s international oil and gas cooperation and any strategic on the 
issue must lead to a change in business organization.
In the past 2 decades, international oil and gas cooperation for China featured a “top-
down” organization. As such, cooperation was always initially led by the central state gov-
ernment of China through inter-government agreements with the national governments 
of partners; thereafter, national oil companies (always only one) worked from beginning 
to end as the state’s proxy to complete the agreement and finally realize the national goal 
(often energy security). Beside CNOCs, the policy planners and monitors are NDRC, the 
State Administration of Energy, and the State Assets Supervisory Administration Com-
mission. Various think tanks such as the Chinese Academy of Engineering provided in-
tellectual support, and financial institutions provided financial assistance. In the process, 
every actor played its own due function, such as research, labor force, financial assistance, 
or material support to make sure the national goal can be realized. This mode is heavily 
influenced by the state-driven mobilization approach in developing Chinese domestic oil 
and gas fields [16].
Under the BRI, companies can have a say in decision-making based on their own busi-
ness interest, at least partially, and definitely are also responsible for economic performance 
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of their decisions. By contrast to the pre-BRI mode, inter-government engagements under 
the BRI provide political foundation and trust, rather than an order for an explicit target. In 
this sense, CNOCs in the international arena are more like the “club team” rather than the 
“national team”. Like CNOCs, different actors can also have their own purposes and make 
decisions about participating in international oil and gas cooperation based on their own 
perspectives of the commercial opportunities. In this scenario, the BRI provides a common 
macro context for policy making. Because of the BRI, above actors who have different 
perspectives and interests can discuss the issue in a more narrowly defined dimension 
and set some more common targets for international cooperation. This move makes the 
whole process of decision-making from different actors more scientific and coordinative but 
certainly less organized like the campaign than 20 years ago.
Under the reformed business organization, the relations among state organs, CNOCs, 
financial institutions, and even other supportive sectors are more diversified; moreover, 
different actors are more independent in the process. Through their participation in the 
Russian Arctic liquefied natural gas (LNG)-2 projects, CNPC and CNOOC equally acquired 
their own 10 % share in the project. At the same time, CNPC and CNOCC jointly developed 
cooperation with other international oil companies such as Shell Oil and Total. In addition, 
Chinese financial institutions and investment funds also play their due roles in international 
oil and gas cooperation under the banner of the BRI. The Silk Road Fund acquired a 9.9 % 
share of the Yamal project, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) provided 
the loans to fund TANAP, the natural gas pipeline connecting Azerbaijan and Europe. In 
these projects and others, the BRI has provided mega project-centered business organization 
under which different actors in the process are driven by respective commercial interests 
and business competitiveness for their own sake. Under the transformation of business 
organization, CNOCs and their subsidiary companies are prudent in entering the fields in 
which they do not have a prior advantage; instead, they are more inclined to cooperate with 
international partners to hedge the risks of investment and operation.
The evolution of energy security strategy
It may be confidently asserted that the BRI does not ignore the issue of energy 
security at all; however, the Chinese perception of energy security has evolved within 
the framework of the BRI. From the state to CNOCs, China gradually accepts a more 
market mechanism-based approach to realize energy security. In practice, the approach 
to realization of a secure oil and gas supply for China has been shifting from bilateral 
cooperation to depending on the open international oil and gas market. In this climate, 
Chinese domestic marketization reform of oil and gas industry have also accelerated.
Since the 1990s, China and CNOCs wish to secure oil and gas supply through bilateral 
cooperation with resource countries. The effort largely consolidates the oil and gas supply 
capacity and supports the Chinese economic development. However, this approach also faces 
challenges. Initially, within a high oil price business circle, resource countries are unwilling 
to engage in bilateral cooperation as international market favors resource countries, this is 
spelled out in the failed proposal of building the Angarsk-Daqing Oil Pipeline. By contrast, 
in the low oil price business circle, bilateral cooperation demonstrates the problem of rigidity 
within China, as oil producers in bilateral cooperation wish to make large profits by selling 
more oil than China cannot consume. Under the market principle of the BRI, bilateral 
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cooperation has gradually merged into international market mechanism. CNOCs select to 
sell what they produce in faraway regions directly to the international market. Under BRI, 
cooperation partners are now the world’s biggest oil producers, like Saudi Arabia and Russia, 
when China buying American shale oil is also on the agenda.
In the domestic arena, the three major CNOCs no longer hold a monopoly over 
China’s international oil and gas business cling the monopoly to running international 
oil and gas business, and so-called “teapot” refineries even can form a strong power to 
influence Chinese domestic market of oil products [17]. In addition, the competition 
within the domestic market is also heated among the three major CNOCs, as they have 
different import channels for oil and gas. Finally, in response to the international norm of 
splitting between energy producers and transporters, China has established a state-owned 
pipeline line company based on the domestic oil and gas pipelines assets of the major 
CNOCs [18].
Case study: China and the Yamal LNG project
The Yamal project is a large-scale LNG production project run by the Russian 
energy company Novatek in the Yamal Peninsula of the Arctic region. The US$ 27 billion 
project is based on the resources in the South Tambey Field and currently includes three 
production lines and a designated annual production capacity of up to 16.5 million tons 
of LNG [19]. Yamal is the first energy project China has engaged in within the Russian 
Arctic region, and the project enabled CNPC for the first time has come to hold a share 
of Russian upstream hydrocarbon assets. In addition, the Yamal project is equipped with 
a special political attribute as it reflects the zeitgeist of the BRI and the jointly launched 
Sino-Russian “Polar Silk Road” strategy [20].
Sino-Russian cooperation on the Yamal project was first negotiated in early 
2015 between then-Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan and then-Russian Vice Premier 
Arkady Dvorkovich. After comfortable time at the highest political level, energy companies 
in China and in Russia began to engage in the project. CNPC and Novatek signed the 
agreement in June 2013, and the ceremony was witnessed by then-Chinese Vice Premier 
Zhang Gaoli and Russian President Vladimir Putin. In following months, CNPC purchased 
a 20 % share of the Yamal project. The first production line was completed 47 months later 
and the whole project was completed seven months early. This construction process was 
highly efficient given the harsh natural conditions of Arctic region and the international 
sanctions against Russia [21].
The transition of purpose: Beyond natural resource
In Sino-Russian energy cooperation before Yamal, CNPC and other Chinese oil 
companies became aware of the nationalistic natural resource policy of Russia (limit for 
foreign shareholding and strict investment review) and dominant role of Russian energy 
companies (majority holder and operator of project must be Russian). Therefore, they 
hesitated to take part in the Yamal project, particularly as several failed or cancelled 
proposals had existed before Yamal, including the cases of attempting by Chinese 
companies to purchase Slavneft and the Angarsk-Daqing oil pipeline. In terms of the 
background of the Yamal project, the initial evaluation from CNPC was not optimistic 
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owing to the project’s location in a high-risk region and its uncertain economic efficiency. 
In addition, CNPC needs to invest a great deal of money in the Yamal project but its share 
in the project is too small to influence decision-making. These points pose difficulties 
CNPC faces in investing in the Yamal project, as it does not meet the traditional principles 
of Chinese oil and gas investment introduced above.
However, CNPC also noticed several advantages to the Yamal project. Initially, the 
shareholders had alternative resources: Novatek is no doubt a rising star in the Russian 
natural gas industry [22], and the LNG business is highly significant for Novathk [23]. In 
addition, other shareholders in the project have their own competitiveness. For example, 
shareholder Gennady Timchenko has a close relationship with the Russian government; 
meanwhile, French oil and gas giant Total has advanced technological and management 
skills. Meanwhile, the Russian government around 2013 issued a series of policies 
favorable to the project, including liberalizing the LNG export [24] and rendering a 
Yamal project tax-cut. In addition, Russia is a “comprehensive strategic partner” with 
China, and the bilateral relation is at the best level in history [25]. Last but not the least, 
Russia is one of the most important partners in the BRI. These points encouraged CNPC 
to decide to invest in the Yamal project, as participation could increase the company’s 
influence and add benefits beyond the natural resources.
Just like the preview of CNPC, Sino-Russian cooperation in the Yamal project soon 
attracted the attention from Chinese government under the BRI. In the subsequent 
meeting between the Chinese and Russian Premiers, cooperation regarding the Arctic 
region was mentioned. At the 2017 Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, Russian President 
Vladimir Putin declared his wish that the Arctic navigation route could be coordinated 
with the BRI. As if in response to Putin’s suggestion, Chinese President Xi Jinping in 
2017 mentioned during his visit to Moscow that China and Russia should cooperate on 
an Arctic navigation route and build up the “Polar Silk Road.” It should not be seen as 
surprising that the concept of the “Polar Silk Road” was formally launched in the White 
Book of “China’s Arctic Policy” in January 2018 [26].
Although Russia and China hold the high political tone in the Arctic region 
cooperation, both the Russian version of the “North Route” and the Chinese BRI indicate 
that the economic value of the Arctic region is mostly rooted in transportation and energy 
cooperation. Currently, the Arctic-based Europe-Asia route is still in its early stage, and 
the Yamal project has become the single realistic focus for the Northern Sea Route [27]. 
Under this scenario, as the only large-scale energy cooperation project between two great 
powers in the strategic Arctic, Yamal naturally has received special political status.
The module-plug-in model in cooperation
As stated above, CNPC is neither the majority shareholder nor the operator in the 
Yamal project; therefore, the traditional UDI model is no longer possible to practice, as 
the Russian company Novatek is operator and the proposed market of the Yamal project 
is Europe. Then, under the light of the BRI, CNPC timely adjusted its own position from 
that of operator to that of constructive partner in the relation with Russian companies, 
and a coordinator in the relation with Chinese domestic companies, introducing Chinese 
companies into the Yamal project [28]. The effort co-exists the West’s sanction against 
Russia, and CNPC’s strategy created many business opportunities for Chinese companies.
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Cooperation in the Yamal project launched the Chinese business presence in 
Russia oil industry into the historical record, as Chinese companies participate also in 
every sector in the industrial chain and supply key parts and modules, from upstream 
exploration and development, to building of modules and ships, to sales and the LNG 
transportation. Seven of 10 mode builders of the Yamal project are Chinese, some of them 
belong to CNOCs while others do not, and their workload accounts for 83 % of the whole 
project. According to CNPC statistics, seven Chinese companies supply 120 of 142 modes, 
seven of 30 ships, and one in four types of drilling equipment in polar areas for the Yamal 
project. Meanwhile, Chinese shipbuilders construct 14 out of 15 LNG ships [29].
At the same time, because the ample production capacity of Chinese companies and 
fierce domestic market competition, the amount bided of Chinese companies are 30 % 
lower those of than South Korean counterparts, and the Yamal project enabled these 
Chinese companies survive and develop in the global economic boom and low oil price 
circle. Participating in the Yamal project provided Chinese companies not only cash flow 
and profits, but, more importantly, the experience of operating international projects [30]. 
Because of the performance and experience in the Yamal project, Chinese companies 
actively participated in Russia’s second large-scale LNG project, the Arctic LNG-2, in 
which CNPC and CNOOC each hold a 10 % share.
In the case of the Yamal project, the role of CNPC has shifted from that of operator 
to that of international partner and domestic coordinator. Meanwhile, the mobilization-
based UDI model is also substituted by the industrial chain-cooperation model. In this 
approach, different Chinese companies, according to their own strategy and advantages, 
can find business opportunities they can handle in the overall industrial chain. Thus, in 
this kind of oil and gas cooperation, oil and gas are no longer the major ends; instead, 
natural resources provide a context for international cooperation, and Chinese companies 
can find commercial profits or international cooperation experience. This approach is also 
reshaping the CNPC, as its critical focus in the Yamal project is “business” rather than 
“oil/gas”. Although this is business-focus is the mainstream approach for most advanced 
international oil companies, it is still new for CNPC, which is derived from Chinese 
Ministry of Petroleum and regards energy supply security as the primary goal.
Multi-actors and market mechanism based cooperation
As the direct result of the market mechanism under the BRI, the Chinese actors in the 
Yamal project are diversified. As introduced in last paragraph, different Chinese oil and 
construction companies participate the in Yamal project. As the follow-up issue to Yamal, 
both CNPC and CNOOC have shares in Russia’s new Arctic LNG-2 project. Moreover, 
beside these oil and construction companies, there are also financial institutions from 
China investing or providing financial service to the Yamal project. Although it is not news 
that Chinese financial institutions get involved in international oil and gas cooperation, the 
Yamal project is noteworthy in that Chinese financial institutions make decisions based on 
their own investment strategy, not to provide financial assistance to a resource-centered 
purpose. Based on their observation of the Russian gas policy and market, China and 
CNPC both appreciate the dynamics and development potential of the emerging Russian 
energy company Novatek; however, in past, China was more inclined to cooperate with 
Gazprom, which has more state background and more reserve equipped but also more 
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ossified giant [31]. The Sino-Russian oil and gas cooperation scenario of “Zhongnanhai 
+ CNPC vs. Kremlin + Gazprom” has certainly changed. It should be noticed that the 
Yamal LNG cannot be directly transported to China cross the Sino-Russian border, as the 
Yamal LNG requires long distance marine transportation as well. From this perspective, 
China is less inclined to considers the international oil and gas cooperation through a 
securitization perspective, and CNOCs’ strategy, like that of China itself, to realize energy 
supply security is changing to become more flexible and more market-based.
The Silk Road Fund in December 2015 acquired a 9.9 % share of the Yamal project from 
Novatek, and additionally provided 15-year long loans valued at €730 million to the project 
[32]. The Silk Road Fund itself was established as a key part of the BRI, aiming at long-term 
equity investment. Different from CNPC, the Silk Road Fund behaves in the Yamal project 
as international standard professional financial investor: its attention is entirely focused on 
the financial performance and potential development of the Yamal project. It is interesting 
that although it is also a Beijing-based Chinese state-run business, the Silk Road Fund 
attempted to make the process of decision- making independent and intentionally did 
not consult with CNPC, as the Silk Road Fund is cautious to the possible misinformation 
provided by CNPC, the 20 % shareholder of Yamal project. The involvement of the Silk 
Road Fund raised the overall Chinese share in the Yamal project to 29.9 %, higher than the 
25 % cap in strategic construction stipulated by Russian government. Apart from CNPC 
and the Silk Road Fund, the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development 
Bank also provide loans valued at €9.3 billion and CNY 9.8 billion to finance the Yamal 
project [33]. The financial activities around the Yamal project in China are commercial 
interests that are not driven by resource access, unlike the previous Sino-Russian energy 
cooperation, as the energy will be supplied to Europe with priority.
The attitude toward the products of the Yamal project reflects the new transition of 
Chinese energy supply strategy. In past 2 decades, China was inclined to realize energy 
supply security through bilateral cooperation. However, after Xi Jinping took power 
and the BRI was implemented, the energy supply has been increasingly regarded as a 
market mechanism. As the main shareholder of the Yamal project, CNPC has the right 
to buy 3 million tons; however, CNPC does not ship all of them back to China. Instead, 
according to prices of different markets, CNPC selects to sell the partial LNG it obtained 
in the Yamal project to Europe when the Asian market was not so vigorous whereas 
the European clients include Vitol, Trafigura, and BP [34]. Of course, Chinese market 
does not exclude Yamal LNG either, as the first ship of Yamal LNG reached to Jiangsu 
LNG terminal in June 2018 [35]. In the process, Yamal LNG does not have much special 
security implication or any special arrangement in the Chinese market, as Yamal LNG 
has to compete with LNG from Qatar and Australia, pipeline gas from Central Asia and 
Myanmar, domestically produced gas, and even potentially with the Russian gas from 
Power of Siberia and American gas from Alaska in the future [36].
Conclusion
For China under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the BRI is the guideline for both diplomacy and 
economic cooperation. Although CNOCs’ international oil and gas cooperation predates 
the BRI, it has to echo the key requests and leitmotif of the mega economic initiative, 
and finally merged into it. Because of the fundamental principles and market mechanism 
Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2020. Т. 13. Вып. 1 31
of the BRI, China’s international oil and gas cooperation shows several new transitions. 
Different from the two-decade-long resource-centered approach, CNOCs have gradually 
shifted their role in international cooperation from that of the operator in the overseas to 
international partners and domestic coordinators, in order to diversify equities and risks. 
The cooperation model changes from upstream-downstream integration to industrial 
chain-based cooperation, in which specialized competitiveness is emphasized, with a 
focus on exporting China’s industrial capacity like engineering service, construction, 
and equipment. In business organization, the Chinese actors are no longer sufficiently 
highly organized to work around the resource-centered investments. Instead, different 
companies seek their own interests in the whole industrial chain. Under this transition, 
China’s energy security strategy is also re-shaped, as China increasingly adopts the market 
mechanism to solve the energy security, and becomes more and more prudent toward the 
securitization approach of energy supply that dominated in China’s overseas oil and gas 
cooperation in past two decades. The Yamal project provides a terse but relevant case to 
display above points.
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